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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations are entities separate and distinct from their shareholders,
and the shareholders' liability for corporate debt is limited to the amount they
have invested into the corporation.' This limitation of liability that corporations
provide is one of the most attractive facets of the corporate form. 2 There are,
however, instances in which courts will disregard the corporate form and hold
the corporation's shareholders personally liable for the corporation's debts.3
This is known as "piercing the corporate veil.",4 The piercing doctrine is widely
recognized, but there is variety across the various jurisdictions as to under what
circumstances the corporate veil may be pierced.5 Some jurisdictions also have
I See ROBERT HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA:
1600 TO THE PRESENT 184 (Wadsworth rev. ed. 1999).
2 Id. (stating that one main advantage of the corporate form is that it eliminates the problem of
unlimited liability that partnerships and sole proprietorships inherently involve).
3 18 AM. JUR. 2D. Corporations § 47 (2004).
4 Id.
5 David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMErrE L. REv. 371, 376 (1981).
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different criteria for tort and contract creditors attempting to hold the corporate
shareholders personally liable.6
West Virginia, like all states,7 allows the corporate veil to be pierced
under certain circumstances and piercing cases under both tort and contract
claims have come before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.8 This
Note, however, focuses primarily on corporate veil piercing in West Virginia
under a contract claim. The seminal case for corporate veil piercing under a
contract claim in West Virginia is Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc..9
In Laya, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that in order
for a contract creditor to pierce the corporate veil, and hold the shareholders
personally liable for the corporation's debts, two specific elements must be
met:10 (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and of the individual shareholder(s) no longer
exist (a disregard of formalities requirement); and (2) an inequitable result
would occur if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone (i.e. a fair-
ness requirement)." The Court also laid out a third prong for certain "sophisti-
cated commercial entities," such as commercial lenders:' 2 certain commercial
entities that have the ability to conduct a pre-contractual investigation of the
corporation's capitalization level will be deemed to have assumed the risk of the
corporation's undercapitalization and will not be permitted to pierce the corpo-
rate veil on that basis.
13
A few years later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, professedly ap-
plying West Virginia law, held that Laya's third prong dealing with sophisti-
cated commercial entities was merely permissive and allowed an entity, just as
sophisticated as the commercial lender example in Laya, to pierce the corporate
veil. 14 The Court also explicitly declined to rule on whether Laya's third prong
was applicable to any sophisticated commercial entity other than the corporate
lender example cited in Laya.15 A later case decided by the West Virginia Su-
6 See David C. Cummins, Disregarding the Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 O1IO ST.
L.J. 441, 443 (1967) (stating that the policy concerns of courts behind "disregarding the corporate
entity in cases not involving consensual transactions, principally tort cases, are different than in
contract cases").
7 See generally Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1036,1049-51 (1991).
8 See, e.g., S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1984)
(tort claim); Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc, 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986) (contract claim).
9 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
10 Id. at 99.
1 Id.
12 Id. at 100.
13 Id. This dicta is generally known as Laya's third "sophisticated commercial entity prong."
14 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).
15 Id. at 213.
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preme Court,' 6 while denying an individual contract creditor of the corporation
the ability to pierce the corporate veil, left an opening for even sophisticated
contract creditors to pierce the veil if they could prove tortious activity such as
fraud or equivalent misfeasance on the part of the corporate shareholders. 7
All sophisticated commercial entities have the ability to conduct a pre-
contractual investigation of the capitalization level of the corporation with
which they are contracting, and can bargain for terms consistent with the risk
associated with the level of the corporation's capitalization. Accordingly,
Laya's third prong should be extended to all sophisticated commercial entities.
Under West Virginia law, any contract creditor deemed by the court to be a "so-
phisticated commercial entity" should not be permitted to pierce the corporate
veil under a purely contractual claim.' 8
Section II of this Note addresses the historical origins of the limited li-
ability corporation as well as economic and public policy justifications for its
existence. Section III discusses the concept of "piercing the corporate veil"
generally and comments on the historical origin of piercing, the various tests
courts use, and the impact that undercapitalization has on the piercing analysis.
Section IV explores corporate veil piercing by contract creditors under West
Virginia law, with particular emphasis on contract claim cases decided by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. Section V suggests an extension of Laya's third prong to all sophisticated
commercial entities, sets out to define "sophisticated commercial entities," and
comments upon the limits of the extension of Laya. Several economic and pub-
lic policy justifications for the extension of Laya's third prong are proffered in
Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the Note by summarizing a few key
16 Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1993).
17 Id. at 5 (citing Gray v. Edgewater Landing, Inc., 541 So.2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989)).
18 The phrase "purely contractual claim" is used to denote a claim by the contract creditor
dealing with a loss associated with the contract itself (i.e. the failure of the defendant corporation
to pay for goods or services), as opposed to a contract creditor that attempts to pierce for "fraud or
equivalent misfeasance" on the part of the corporate shareholders under Mills. See generally Mills,
438 S.E.2d 1. An action to pierce the veil for fraud by the contract creditor would actually fall
under a tort, as opposed to a contract, theory of piercing. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL § 1:10 (2005). The purely contractual claim is most easily distinguished from
the pure tort claim of piercing, which would be a tort claim by an individual or entity that had no
previous dealing with the defendant corporation. See e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6
(N.Y. 1966) (plaintiff attempted to pierce on a pure tort claim after he was hit by a cab owned by
the defendant's corporation with which the plaintiff had no previous dealings). If the claim for
piercing is a tort claim by a contract creditor that had previous knowledge of the capitalization
level of the defendant corporation, the distinction becomes blurred. See Mills, 438 S.E.2d 1 (con-
tract creditor that had previous dealings with the defendant corporation attempted to pierce the
corporate veil on a tort theory), discussed infra. Because this Note deals primarily with contract
claims for piercing, much of the implications of the holding of Mills dealing with the ability of
contract creditors to pierce under a tort claim are outside the scope of the Note. However, see
Section V.C., infra, summarizing a few key points regarding the contract creditor's ability to
pierce on a tort theory for fraud or equivalent misfeasance.
[Vol. 109
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points concerning the extension of Laya's third prong to all sophisticated com-
mercial entities.
II. THE LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATION: ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY
JUSTIFICATIONS
Corporations are solely a creature of state legislation.19 They would not
exist without the various state legislative mandates giving them life. These stat-
utes normally contain the same basic elements; they state that the corporation
has most of the rights of natural persons, including the ability to enter into con-
tracts, to sue, and to be sued.20 Additionally, all states have statutory provisions
that limit the liability of a corporation's shareholders to their respective capital
investments in the corporation. 2' This was not always the case. Early in Amer-
ica's history many states did not afford corporate investors the limitation of li-
ability that shareholders in modern corporations now enjoy. 22 However, the
attitudes of state legislatures began to change as ideas emerged concerning the
impact that corporations had on political and economic opportunities in the
United States.23
A. The Origin of the Limited Liability Corporation
There is some authority for the premise that the limited liability corpo-
ration had its roots in England as early as the seventeenth century. 24 However,
just how far the idea of limited liability spread into America after the Revolution
is not clear.25 Early in America's history many states imposed unlimited liabil-
ity on shareholders.26 This was because state legislatures were concerned that
limited liability would negatively affect economic development by making
creditors less willing to lend corporations money to expand.27 By the mid-1800s
many states, led by New York (the leading industrial state in the first half of the
19 See generally Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 16 US (4 Wheat) 518 (U.S. Sup. Ct.
1819); see also Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 535 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988).
20 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 411 (Callaghan 1931).
21 See id. at 412-13.
22 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:3.
23 See RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BusINESS CORPORATION, 1784-
1855 258 (Greenwood Press 1982).
24 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:3.
25 Id.
26 See SEAVOY, supra note 23, at 44. For example, the state of New York allowed many types
of businesses to incorporate, but only offered the shareholders of certain types of corporations
limited liability. Id.
27 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:3.
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nineteenth century),28 began to arrive at the conclusion that the best means to
further the policy objective of increased capital formation was to encourage
shareholders to invest into corporations by limiting their liability for corporate
debt.29 Many states around the country quickly followed suit as the limited li-
ability corporation came into prominence.
For these nineteenth century legislators in New York, "who mandated
the limited liability for corporations' shareholders, the imposition of limited
liability was perceived as a means of encouraging the small scale entrepreneur,
and of keeping the entry into business markets competitive and democratic.'
These legislators thought that under a system of unlimited liability, less wealthy
investors would be hesitant to invest in corporations for fear of being "wiped
out" by the imposition of the corporations' liabilities upon them.32 The basic
premise behind the limitation of liability, at least in New York, was to allow
men of any financial means to take part in the great economic expansion occur-
ring during the period.33 New York's incorporation statutes, in essence, "lev-
eled the playing field" for all investors by allowing men of even modest means
to participate in "businesses that could most advantageously be organized as
corporations. '" 34 This was an opportunity that, up until the limitation of liability,
was afforded only to men with capital reserves significant enough to insulate
them from the risk of the corporate default, and being held personally liable for
the corporation's debts.35 This democratic view of limited liability, at the time,
existed in conjunction with what is traditionally known as the modern or "eco-
nomic" justification of the limited liability corporation; higher overall levels of
capital investment and greater investment in "riskier" business ventures.36
B. The Modern Economic Justification for the Limited Liability Corpora-
tion
While the original democratic justifications for the modem limited li-
ability corporation may have been lost over time, the economic justification for
the corporate form still carries weight.37 A corporation is not actually a person,
"but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction. It has a
28 See SEAVOY, supra note 23, at 59. During this period "[t]he New York City business com-
munity. . . was foremost in the country in energy, originality, and aggressiveness." kd




33 SEAVOY, supra note 23, at 185.
34 Id.
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real existence with rights and liabilities as a separate legal entity., 38 It is pre-
cisely this existence, separate and distinct from its shareholders, which contin-
ues to make the corporate form so attractive. The public's potential gain from
the policy of limited liability, which encourages greater investment and risk-
taking by corporate investors, has remained the leading justification behind the
modern corporate form.
39
By limiting the liability of shareholders, diversification and investment
in numerous companies are encouraged. 4° If a shareholder was potentially liable
for the debts of any company in which he or she invested, the rational investor,
if he or she invested in any corporation at all, would only invest in the one cor-
poration that had the least risk associated with it.41 To illustrate, if an investor
bought stock in one hundred different companies (as in the modern day mutual
fund), there would be a great risk that at least one of those companies would be
unable to meet its contractual obligations and the shareholder would be held
personally liable.42 With limited liability, the investor is encouraged to buy
shares in more corporations; far more than under a system of unlimited liabil-
ity.
43
Moreover, the limited liability corporation encourages investment in
riskier ventures than does a system of unlimited liability. Under unlimited li-
ability, the rational investor would be hesitant to invest in companies that were
not "sure things" for fear of being held personally liable for the corporation's
debts if it was to fail to meet its obligations. " The lessened risk associated with
limited liability reduces the costs associated with obtaining the needed investors
and allows small, unproven companies to raise the capital they need; thus, fos-
tering greater economic growth in the economy.
45
One commentator quite aptly summed up the great impact the corporate
form has had on the American economy when he stated: "I weigh my words
when I say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest
single discovery of modern times. . . .Even steam and electricity are far less
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to
comparative impotence without it."46 By limiting their liability, shareholders
38 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 414.
39 See Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987).
40 See Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-
Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 274 (2005) (stating that in today's economy the "rational
investor must diversify" in order to maximize returns and minimize risk) (emphasis in original).
41 Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing for all Limited Liability Companies: Forcing the
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 106 (2001).
42 See id.
43 See Booth, supra note 40.
44 Huss, supra note 41.
45 See Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1987).
46 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001) (quoting
from a speech by President Nicholas Murray of Columbia University in 1911).
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are much more likely to invest in many more companies, as well as riskier com-
panies, than they otherwise would under a system of unlimited liability.47 The
persistence of this view from the very beginning of the rise of the limited liabil-
ity corporation in the United States to the present day, as well as the vast num-
ber of corporations created every year in the United States,4 8 evidences the va-
lidity of this view.
III. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A. What is "Piercing the Corporate Veil?"
The modern concept of stockholder immunity from liability for the
debts of the corporation is not absolute. There are instances in which the corpo-
rate form will be disregarded. 49 This disregard is known as "piercing the corpo-
rate veil.",50 Generally, piercing the corporate veil is the concept of disregarding
the formal and distinct existence of the corporate legal fiction and holding its
shareholders personally liable for corporate debts. 51 The corporate veil gener-
ally will be pierced when "a court determines that the debt in question is not
really a debt of the corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of
the individual or corporate shareholder or shareholders. ''52 Piercing the corpo-
rate veil is not an action separate and independent of that against the corpora-
tion; rather, it is an assertion of facts and circumstances that persuades the court
to impose corporate liability on its shareholders.53 Piercing is not a cause of
action in and of itself, but merely a "procedural means of allowing liability on a
substantive claim. ' '54 Because courts recognize the importance of the corporate
system and its impact on the American economy, piercing the corporate veil is a
rare circumstance.55
47 See Huss, supra note 41.
48 See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1993 TABLE 531. A 1989 census by the United States Bureau of Census showed
that there had been 3.6 million public and private corporations created in the United States since
its inception. Id.
49 See 18 AM. JUR. 2D., supra note 3.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:1.
53 18 AM. JUR. 2D., supra note 3. While piercing is not an action separate from the action
against the corporation, veil piercing is also commonly used in conjunction with other separate
and distinct causes of action against the corporate shareholders by plaintiffs wishing to hold the
shareholders personally liable for the corporation's debts. These other causes of action, depend-
ing upon the circumstances of the individual case, often include fraud, commercial misrepresenta-
tion, and enterprise liability. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 517-27.
54 Id.
55 See generally Thompson, supra note 7.
[Vol. 109
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In theory, the piercing doctrine applies to all corporations whether they
are large, publicly-held corporations or small, closely-held family corpora-
tions.56 However, there has never been a situation in which a court has held the
individual shareholders of a public corporation or private corporation with
widely-dispersed shares liable for the corporation's debts.57 Because of this, the
piercing doctrine applies primarily to closely-held corporations.58 Accordingly,
many of the factors used by courts to determine if the veil should be pierced
appear much more frequently in close corporations than in large, publicly-traded
corporations.59
B. Historical Origins of Corporate Veil Piercing
After the rise of the limited liability corporation in the United States
during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the view that shareholders should
be held liable for the corporation's debts subsided. 60 The period in which the
limited liability corporation gained its most prominence (late nineteenth century
through the early twentieth century) was a time of relative prosperity in Amer-
ica's history, and there may have been less of a temptation to hold shareholders
personally liable for corporate debts.6 '
After the Great Stock Market Crash of 1929, many scholars began to
envision ways to hold corporate shareholders liable for the injustices perpetrated
56 Barber, supra note 5, at 372.
57 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1055.
58 Id. The study conducted by Thompson found that the vast majority of piercing claims were
brought against close corporations. Id. The study also found that in close corporations, as the
number of shareholders increased the percentage of successful piercing cases decreased. Id.
59 L. S. Tellier, Inadequate Capitalization as Factor in Disregard of Corporate Entity, 63
A.L.R.2d 1051 (2006). Many of the factors used by courts deal with the failure of the corporate
shareholders or directors to maintain the formalities of the corporate form (i.e. the failure to issue
stock and the failure to keep adequate corporate records) apply almost exclusively to closely-held
corporations because larger corporations have boards in place to see that the corporate formalities
are followed. See RALPH D. WARD, IMPROVING CORPORATE BOARDS: THE BOARDROOM INSIDER
GUIDEBOOK 3 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000) (stating that setting and following board opera-
tional rules is a "must" for any corporate entity).
The emphasis that many courts place on the disregard of corporate formalities as a ground to
pierce close corporations also has important implications for other legal entities, such as limited
liability companies. Many states, including West Virginia, have statutes in place stating that the
very "corporate formalities" found lacking in cases in which the corporate veil has been pierced,
do not apply to limited liability companies. See W. VA. CODE § 3 lB-3-303(b) (2005) (stating that
"[t]he failure of a limited liability company to observe the usual company formalities or require-
ments relating to the exercise of its company powers or management of its business is not ground
for imposing personal liability on the members or managers for liabilities of the company").
Accordingly, what activity on the part of the members of a limited liability company would be
required to "pierce" these entities is very much in doubt. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77 (2005).
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by their corporations. 62 This was particularly true in the fraudulent issuance of
stock, which was a significant problem during the years surrounding the Great
Crash.63 Scholars proffered various theories to deal with this and other prob-
lems faced by individuals wronged by the improper use of the corporate form.64
More cases of veil piercing began to occur in the decades following the Great
Crash as the general decline in the national economy led to different views on
the role of the corporate form in America.65
C. Policy Behind Piercing the Corporate Veil
Piercing began as an equitable remedy, 66 and it has grown into a com-
plex and vital common law doctrine.67 Traditionally, corporate veil piercing has
been allowed only when recognizing the corporate form would create an unfair
result to the corporation's creditors. 68 One of the most famous (and most com-
monly quoted) comments upon the theory behind veil piercing was stated by
Judge Sanborn in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a gen-
eral rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but,
when the notion of a legal entity is used to defeat public con-
venience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law
will regard the corporation as an association of persons. 69
Because the basic factor under the piercing doctrine is fairness to the
corporation's creditors, courts often make a distinction between veil piercing
under tort and contract claims.7 ° Many courts recognize that because contract
creditors are voluntary creditors, they have a heavier burden of proof than tort
creditors. 71 These courts often cite the opportunity for the contract creditor to
investigate the assets of the corporation before contracting as weighing heavily
against the contract creditor in the "fairness analysis. 72 Because tort creditors





66 Cummins, supra note 6, at 442.
67 PRESSER, supra note 18, at § 1:1.
68 See FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 563, 605.
69 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, at 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905) (quoted in PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:1).
70 See, e.g., J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1980).
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consensus is that piercing is permitted more often for tort than for contract
creditors.73
D. The Various Tests for Piercing
The circumstances under which courts allow the corporate veil to be
pierced are anything but consistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 74 One com-
mentator has stated that the law of piercing the corporate veil is "like lightning.
• . rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is consensus that the whole area of lim-
ited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most
confusing in corporate law.",75 There seems to be as many different views on
what is needed in order to pierce the veil as there are theories of, or individual
attitudes concerning, the corporate form.
76
That being said, courts generally look to the "totality of the circum-
stances" when dealing with corporate veil piercing.77 This test, though, is "ap-
plied by judges in an extremely discretionary manner, in accordance with the
individual consciences of judges."78 Some courts follow a two-prong test to
determine if piercing is appropriate in light of the facts.79 This two-prong test is
more of a summary of the overall factors used in the "totality of the circum-
stances" approach.8 ° Courts that use this approach will generally allow piercing
when (1) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate exis-
tences of the corporation and the individual shareholders do not exist; and (2) if
the acts of the corporation are treated as those of the corporation alone, an equi-
table result will follow.8' Another famous piercing test has been deemed the
"instrumentality" test.82 This test asks whether the corporation is an instrumen-
73 Id. at 381. The opposite is actually true; an empirical study on veil piercing cases conducted
in 1985 found that up to that point, there had been more piercing permitted for contract than tort
creditors. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1058.
74 See Barber, supra note 5, at 376-77.
75 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:1.
76 Id.
77 See infra note 122 for a list of factors many courts deem pertinent to the piercing analysis.
78 PRESSER, supra note 18, at § 1:3.
79 See, e.g., Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840 N.E.2d 767, 776 (111. App. Ct. 2005); Barton v.
Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997); Peschel Family Trust v. Colonna, 75 P.3d 793, 796-
97 (Mont. 2003); Osloond v. Osloond, 609 N.W.2d 118, 122 (S.D. 2000).
80 See, e.g., Fontana, 840 N.E.2d at 776; Barton, 558 N.W.2d at 749; Peschel, 75 P.3d at 796-
97; Osloond, 609 N.W.2d at 122.
81 PRESSER, supra note 18, at § 1:9. West Virginia uses this test. See Laya v. Erin Homes,
Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986).
82 See PRESSER, supra note 18, at § 1:8. The "instrumentality" rule has been stated by Robert
Clark, once Dean of the Harvard Law School, as "the corporate veil will be pierced, and the share-
holders and/or the controlling parties will be subjected to personal liability for the debts of the
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tality or mere "alter ego" of the corporate shareholders or the corporation's par-
ent company.83 If a court finds that the corporation is in fact an alter ego or in-
strumentality of the corporate shareholders, then the corporate veil will be
pierced.84 These are merely a few examples of ways courts analyze cases under
the piercing doctrine. There are many other variations on the "totality of the
circumstances," "two-prong," and "instrumentality" tests discussed above that
courts in various jurisdictions across the United States often use. 5
E. Undercapitalization as a Reason to Pierce
1. Undercapitalization and its Impact on Veil Piercing
Undercapitalization is generally defined as operating a corporation
"without providing it with at least a certain minimal level of assets in light of the
business in which the corporation is engaged., 86 The basic premise behind the
"undercapitalization" or "inadequate capitalization" theory is that if the "share-
holder or shareholders deliberately incorporate with initial capital that they
know to be inadequate to meet the expected liabilities of the business they in-
tended to be doing, they are engaging in an abuse of the corporate form, and
ought to be individually liable when those liabilities actually occur., 87 Author
Henry Winthrop Ballantine provided further comment upon the duty of share-
holders to adequately capitalize the corporation for its undertaking when he
stated that:
83 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:8. The instrumentality rule, according to Clark, demands a
showing of:
(1) control and complete domination, not only in finances but of policy and
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate
entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence
of its own; and (2) such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other posi-
tive legal duty, or a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of a plaintiff's le-
gal rights; and (3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately
cause the injury or unjust loss complained of.
Id. (citing Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967)).
The "instrumentality" rule has also been used to hold parent corporations liable for the
actions of their subsidiary corporations. See, e.g., Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (N.C.
1985) (stating that "a corporation which exercises actual control over another, operating the latter
as a mere instrumentality or tool, is liable for the torts of the corporation thus controlled. In such
instances, the separate identities of parent and subsidiary or affiliated corporations may be disre-
garded.").
84 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:8.
85 See generally FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 617-635.
86 Harvey Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil - The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 Ctn.-KENT
L. REv. 1, 3 (1982).
87 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:9.
[Vol. 109
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss1/9
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
[i]t is coming to be recognized as the policy of the law that
shareholders should in good faith put at risk of the business un-
incumbered [sic] capital reasonably adequate for its prospective
liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with the
business to be done and the risk of loss, this is a ground for de-
nying the separate entity privilege. 88
Even with this strong language from various commentators concerning
capitalization and veil piercing, there have been no recent cases in which a court
has deemed undercapitalization as per se triggering the piercing of the corporate
veil.89 Courts generally recognize that undercapitalization alone will not allow
the veil to be pierced.9° Most jurisdictions demand that something more, such
as the disregard of corporate formalities, be present to lead to the subjection of
the shareholders of liability for the debts of the corporation, and merely list un-
dercapitalization as one factor in the piercing analysis. 9'
2. When and How Courts Measure Capitalization Levels
Capitalization is normally measured at the time of the formation of the
corporation. 92 A corporation is not considered undercapitalized if it has adequate
capitalization when formed, but later suffers financial reverses that result in
undercapitalization. 93 However, if a company is adequately capitalized at its
inception for its forecasted purpose, but later greatly expands the nature of its
undertaking without acquiring additional "risk capital" from its shareholders, it
may be deemed by the court to be "undercapitalized." 94 Because of this, de-
pending upon the circumstances, courts will often look at the level of capitaliza-
tion between the corporation's inception and the date of the alleged wrong or
injustice.
95
There are several methods that courts use to measure undercapitaliza-
tion.96 Normally courts compare the capitalization level of the defendant corpo-
ration with the standard level of capitalization in the corporation's respective
industry based upon debt/equity ratios or other standard industry-wide measures
88 HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 303 (Callaghan & Co.
1946).
89 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:9.
90 See Carlesmo v. Schwebel, 197 P.2d 167, 174 (Cal. App. 1948) (stating that both undercapi-
talization and injustice to the creditor must be shown in order to pierce).
91 See Labors Clean-up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriate Clean-Up Services, Inc., 736
F.2d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir.1984). See also PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:9.
92 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 652.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 653. See also J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1980).
95 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 652-53.
96 See, e.g., Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 101 (W. Va. 1986).
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of capitalization. 97 Undercapitalization is usually grouped under the "fairness"
category of factors in the analysis because if a corporation is knowingly capital-
ized at a level that is insufficient to meet the liabilities of the corporation, it is
inequitable to allow the shareholders to escape personal liability for the corpo-
rate debts. 98 Capitalization levels are particularly pertinent in cases dealing with
close corporations because undercapitalization is more likely to occur in close
corporations than publicly-traded corporations that have raised capital through
selling shares to the general public. 99
IV. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL UNDER A CONTRACT CLAIM IN WEST
VIRGINIA
West Virginia, like all other states, has a provision limiting the liability
of shareholders for the debts of the corporation in which they have invested. 100
This statute reads in pertinent part: "[u]nless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the
acts or debts of the corporation except that he or she may become personally
liable by reason of his or her own acts or conduct."' '1
Under West Virginia law, there is a presumption that corporations, even
those that are closely held, "are separate from their shareholders" and that "a
corporate shareholder's liability is usually limited to his or her capital invest-
ment in the corporation, and the shareholder is normally not individually liable
to a creditor of the corporation.' 10 2 However, West Virginia courts do recognize
the concept of corporate veil piercing when the corporate form is "urged with an
intent not within [the corporate form's] reason and purpose, and in such a way
that its retention would promote injustices or inequitable consequences."10 3
While piercing is recognized in West Virginia, there have been relatively few
cases in the state under the piercing doctrine. 104
West Virginia does make a distinction, like many states, between corpo-
rate veil piercing in contract and tort contexts.105 However, the West Virginia
Supreme Court has changed its view over the years on what circumstances must
97 See Barber, supra note 5, at 392-94.
98 FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 648.
99 Id. at 651-52.
100 See generally id. at 12-13.
101 W. VA. CODE § 31 D-6-622(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
102 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 97 (W. Va- 1986).
103 Sanders v. Roselawn Mem'l Gardens, Inc., 159 S.E.2d 784, 800 (W. Va. 1968).
104 PRESSER, supra note 18, at § 2:23. See also Thompson, supra note 7, at 1049. The Thomp-
son study, conducted in 1985, found that there had been only seven piercing cases to come before
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals up to that point. Id. A Westlaw search similar to
the search conducted by Thompson was conducted by the Author in late 2006. This search identi-
fied sixteen piercing cases as having come before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
105 See Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 1993).
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be present in order for the corporate veil to be pierced under a contract claim. 106
Earlier cases under the piercing doctrine in West Virginia placed the state in line
with jurisdictions that were more hesitant to pierce the corporate veil.' 07 As late
as 1984, the West Virginia Supreme Court seemed to suggest a more cautious
approach to piercing. 108
Later cases decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals have placed West Virginia in line with jurisdictions
that take a more "freewheeling approach" to veil piercing by "unsophisticated"
contract creditors, particularly when "gross undercapitalization" of the corpora-
tion is involved.'°9 At the same time, these cases mandated a much higher bur-
den for sophisticated contract creditors wishing to pierce.110 One of the latest
piercing cases in West Virginia under a contract claim has moved the state once
again to a more restrictive view of piercing for all contract creditors, while pro-
viding these creditors the ability to pierce in narrow circumstances; if the credi-
tor could prove some sort of tortious activity by the corporate shareholders. "
There are several key cases that lay out the basics of the piercing doc-
trine in West Virginia under claims by contract creditors. These cases show
how the piercing doctrine under West Virginia law has changed over the past
several decades. The most significant cases under the piercing doctrine in West
Virginia in terms of defining the general test that contract creditors of the corpo-
ration must meet to pierce the corporate veil are Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 112
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan,113 and Mills v. USA Mobile Communications,
Inc.. 114
A. Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc.
1. Factual History and the West Virginia Supreme Court's Rea-
soning
The seminal case in West Virginia for the corporate veil piercing con-
cept in a contract context is Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc.," 5 In Laya, a couple con-
106 Compare Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5 (more cautious approach to veil piercing), with Laya v. Erin
Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 97 (W. Va. 1986) (more "freewheeling" approach).
107 See Sanders, 159 S.E.2d 784.
108 See generally S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515, 521-22
(W. Va. 1984).
109 See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Laya, 352
S.E.2d at 97.
110 See Kinney Shoe, 939 F.2d 209; see also Laya, 352 S.E.2d 93.
III Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5 (W. Va. 1993).
112 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
113 939 F.2d 209.
14 438 S.E.2d 1.
115 352 S.E.2d. 93 (W. Va. 1986).
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tracted with Erin Homes, a company incorporated in West Virginia for the pur-
pose of manufacturing mobile homes, to purchase a mobile home.116 When Erin
Homes allegedly breached the contract between the parties, the Layas sued the
corporation, as well as Michael Ferns, the owner of the corporation, individually
under a piercing theory. 117 The trial court dismissed Michael Ferns individually
due to an absence of evidence of fraud and an absence of a complete disregard
of the corporate formalities. 1
18
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals began its
piercing analysis by quoting the definition of corporate veil piercing laid out
previously in Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.: 119
[w]hile legally speaking, a corporation constitutes an entity
separate and apart from the persons who own it, such is a fiction
of the law introduced for purpose of convenience and to sub-
serve the ends of justice; and it is now well settled, as a general
principle, that the fiction should be disregarded when it is urged
with an intent not within its reason and purpose, and in such a
way that its retention would produce injustices or inequitable
consequences.120
Like many courts, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated
that veil piercing cases are sui generis and that each case must be examined on
an ad hoc basis, with a case-by-case analysis based upon specific factual de-
tails. 121 The Laya court then listed nineteen factors that various other jurisdic-
tions have used in their piercing analyses under the "totality of the circum-
stances" test. 122 The court then, without analyzing any of the factors it previ-
116 Id. at 96.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 159 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1968). Sanders was one of the first piercing cases to come before
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
120 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 97-98 (quoting Sanders, 159 S.E.2d 784 at Syl. Pt. 10).
121 Id. at 98 (citing S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515 (1984)).
122 Id. at 98-99. The nineteen factors the West Virginia Supreme Court deemed important were:
(1) commingling of funds and other assets of the corporation with those of the
individual shareholders; (2) diversion of the corporation's funds or assets to
noncorporate uses (to the personal uses of the corporation's shareholders); (3)
failure to maintain the corporate formalities necessary for the issuance of or
subscription to the corporation's stock, such as formal approval of the stock is-
sue by the board of directors; (4) an individual shareholder representing to
persons outside the corporation that he or she is personally liable for the debts
or other obligations of the corporation; (5) failure to maintain corporate min-
utes or adequate corporate records; (6) identical equitable ownership in two
entities; (7) identity of the directors and officers of two entities who are re-
sponsible for supervision and management (a partnership or sole proprietor-
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ously listed, "switched judicial gears" and laid out the usual two-prong test that
many courts use in their piercing analysis under a contract claim: 3
(1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and of the individual
shareholder(s) no longer exist (a disregard of formalities re-
quirement) and (2) an inequitable result would occur if the acts
are treated as those of the corporation alone (a fairness require-
ment). 124
The court, in dicta, 25 also recognized the outer limits of the piercing
doctrine under a contract claim, at least when some types of sophisticated com-
mercial entities are involved. This third prong was laid out by the court as fol-
lows:
[T]here may also be a third prong to the test for piercing the
corporate veil which must be hurdled by certain types, and only
ship and a corporation owned and managed by the same parties); (8) failure to
adequately capitalize a corporation for the reasonable risks of the corporate
undertaking; (9) absence of separately held corporate assets; (10) use of a cor-
poration as a mere shell or conduit to operate a single venture or some particu-
lar aspect of the business of an individual or another corporation; (11) sole
ownership of all the stock by one individual or members of a single family;
(12) use of the same office or business location by the corporation and its in-
dividual shareholder(s); (13) employment of the same employees or attorney
by the corporation and its shareholder(s); (14) concealment or misrepresenta-
tion of the identity of the ownership, management or financial interests in the
corporation, and concealment of personal business activities of the sharehold-
ers (sole shareholders do not reveal the association with a corporation, which
makes loans to them without adequate security); (15) disregard of legal for-
malities and failure to maintain proper arm's length relationships among re-
lated entities; (16) use of a corporate entity as a conduit to procure labor, ser-
vices or merchandise for another person or entity; (17) diversion of corporate
assets from the corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity to
the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between
entities to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another; (18) con-
tracting by the corporation with another person with the intent to avoid the
risk of nonperformance by use of the corporate entity; or the use of a corpora-
tion as a subterfuge for illegal transactions; (19) the formation and use of the
corporation to assume the existing liabilities of another person or entity.
Id.
123 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 2:53.
124 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99.
125 This language in Laya is dicta because the Layas were not deemed by the Court to be "so-
phisticated commercial entities." This is presumably because they were individual consumers and
did not have the financial means to conduct a credit check, nor the bargaining power to demand
contractual terms consistent with the risk associated with the corporation's level of capitalization
before contracting to purchase a mobile home.
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certain types, of contract creditors of the corporation, specifi-
cally, those capable of protecting themselves. When, under the
circumstances, it would be reasonable for that particular type of
a party entering into the contract with the corporation, for ex-
ample, a bank or other lending institution, to conduct an inves-
tigation of the credit of the corporation prior to entering into the
contract, such party will be charged with the knowledge that a
reasonable credit investigation would disclose. If such an in-
vestigation would disclose that the corporation is grossly under-
capitalized, based upon the nature and the magnitude of the
corporate undertaking, such party will be deemed to have as-
sumed the risk of the gross undercapitalization and will not be
permitted to pierce the corporate veil. 126
Arter citing Iron City, 127 a piercing case under a contract claim decided
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia,
for the presumption that most parties assume an adequate level of capitaliza-
tion, 1 28 the court, noting that capitalization levels would most often occur in
cases dealing with close corporations, defined "grossly inadequate capitaliza-
tion." 129 The court stated that "grossly inadequate capitalization" was a "sub-
stantial deficiency of capital compared with that level of capitalization deemed
adequate in the case by financial analyst experts."'' 30 These experts, according
to the court, could rely on various methods to compute the capital level of the
business at issue in relation to similar businesses.'13 Some methods suggested
by the court were "current ratio, acid-test ratio, [and] debt/equity ratio.' 32 The
comparison of these industry averages to the corporation at issue could be, ac-
cording to the court, "buttressed by expert testimony from certified public ac-
countants, securities analysts, investment counselors or other qualified financial
analysts."'
' 33
The West Virginia Supreme Court stated that under West Virginia law,
the fact that a corporation's capitalization level is grossly inadequate along with
the disregard of corporate formalities causing unfairness is "sufficient to pierce
the corporate veil in order to hold the shareholders ... personally liable,"1  and
126 Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
127 Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough County v. W. Fork Towing Corp., 298
F.Supp. 1091, 1099 (N.D. W. Va. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1971).
128 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.





134 Id. at 103.
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that the fact-based nature of the piercing analysis made these cases rarely, if
ever, proper for summary judgment. 135 Noting this, the court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of shareholder liability and re-
manded the case for further factual development.' 
36
2. The Significance of Laya
The West Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Laya showed a move-
ment toward a greater willingness to pierce, at least when dealing with under-
capitalized corporations. The Court recognized, though, that undercapitalization
alone would not be enough to pierce the corporate veil: "it is clear that grossly
inadequate capitalization combined with disregard of corporate formalities,
causing basic unfairness, are sufficient to pierce the corporate veil."'
137
The most significant aspect of Laya is the third prong commented upon
in dicta by the Court. 138 While an addition to the traditional two-prong test
summarizing the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the third prong places
a significant amount of weight on the corporation's level of capitalization. In
the third prong of the test developed in Laya,139 the West Virginia Supreme
Court stated that some sophisticated contract creditors would be charged with
the knowledge of the corporation's capitalization level at the time just before the
contractual obligation was incurred.' 40 This places West Virginia in the narrow
group of jurisdictions that measure capitalization levels at a time other than the
date of incorporation. 141
As noted earlier, most courts list undercapitalization as just one of the
factors used in the piercing analysis. 142 In Laya's third prong, the West Virginia
Supreme Court stated that gross undercapitalization, if present before contract-
ing, would prevent the sophisticated entity with the ability to conduct a credit
check from piercing.143 Such a bright-line rule concerning capitalization is quite
a departure from the traditional "totality of the circumstances" approach that
many jurisdictions use under their piercing analyses.' 44 This bright-line rule is
appropriate because of the timing of the credit check that some creditors are
charged with conducting under West Virginia law.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
138 See id. at 100.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 2:54.
142 See id. § 1:9.
143 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986).
144 See Barber, supra note 5, at 374-75.
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In jurisdictions where capitalization is measured back at the date of in-
corporation, 14 the alleged wrong may be many months or years after the date on
which the level of capitalization is measured. The further removed the alleged
injustice is from the date that capitalization is measured, the less significance
this factor would have on the analysis because of the other factors that could
arise between the date of incorporation and the alleged wrong. The amount of
capital a company has immediately before contracting has a greater bearing on
its ability to pay its obligations than the amount of capital with which the corpo-
ration was formed. Also, the inability of the corporation to fulfill its contractual
obligations (i.e. failure to pay for goods/services) would be the only justification
for bringing a purely contractual claim to pierce. Because of this, the extreme
importance the Laya court placed on capitalization is proper.
Through its comments on the third prong, the court did recognize some
limits to the piercing doctrine under a contract claim.'46 The court, with its ad-
dition to the normal two-prong test, "appeared to take a cautious step backwards
in the direction of remembering that there were some valid constraints on dis-
cretion to pierce the veil, particularly in contract actions." 147 The addition of
this other prong put West Virginia in line with many jurisdictions that mandate a
higher burden for contract creditors than tort creditors under the piercing doc-
trine. 148 However at the same time, this prong raises the importance of capitali-
zation under the piercing doctrine in West Virginia, at least for sophisticated
commercial entities, to a level much higher than in other jurisdictions. 1
49
The West Virginia Supreme Court, while discussing the third prong,
recognized that under some circumstances certain sophisticated commercial
entities will not be permitted to pierce the corporate veil.150  However, the
court's comments on this third prong leave many questions regarding when and
how it should be applied. The court did not lay out any clear guidelines under
which courts could deem that an entity had assumed the risk of undercapitaliza-
tion nor did it give any clear definition of a "sophisticated commercial entity"
save for the example of a corporate lender.
145 See FLETCHER, supra note 20, at 652.
146 See Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
147 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 2:53.
148 See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 692-693 (5th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing Texas law); Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D. 1985).
149 Compare Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100 (if undercapitalization present, and the sophisticated
entity was in a position to know about it, is the entity is precluded from piercing), with Riddle v.
Simmons, 922 So.2d 1267, 1279-1280 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (undercapitalization, whether known
by the creditor or not, just one of the factors used in the analysis).
ISO Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
[Vol. 109
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss1/9
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
B. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan: A Misapplication of the Laya Test?
I. Factual Summary and the Fourth Circuit's Ruling
A few years after Laya, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in Kinney Shoe,151 had the opportunity to expound upon the "so-
phisticated commercial entity prong" that was first laid out in Laya. In this
case, the Fourth Circuit, without deciding whether the prong should be extended
beyond "the context of the financial institutional lender mentioned in Laya,"'1
52
allowed a sophisticated commercial entity to pierce the corporate veil in a con-
tract claim by reasoning that Laya's third prong was merely permissive and
should not be used when its application would not lead to an equitable result. 153
In this case, Kinney Shoe, a New York corporation that was a subsidi-
ary of the F.W. Woolworth Corporation, 154 contracted with Industrial Realty
Company, a West Virginia corporation owned by Lincoln Polan, for the sub-
lease of a building leased by Kinney Shoe Corporation. 155 At the time of the
sublease agreement, Industrial Realty Company had "no assets, no income and
no bank account."' 156 Industrial then leased part of the building to Polan Indus-
tries, Inc., another company owned by Polan.157 After one month, Industrial
stopped paying rent on the sublease to Kinney Shoe thereby breaching the lease
agreement. 158 Kinney Shoe filed suit against Industrial and obtained a judgment
in excess of $160,000.159 Industrial subsequently filed bankruptcy and Kinney
Shoe filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia against Lincoln Polan, Industrial's owner, for the corporation's
debts under a piercing theory.' 60
The district court found that the first two prongs of the Laya test had
been satisfied because there was such a unity of interest between Lincoln Polan
and Industrial that the corporation had no separate existence (the disregard of
formalities requirement), and an equitable result would not occur if the actions
of Industrial were solely attributed to the company (the fairness requirement). 161
The fact that Industrial's capitalization level was grossly inadequate and that
151 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).
152 Id. at 212-13.
153 Id. at 213.
154 See KATHLEEN McDERMOTr, RETAIL REVOLUTIONARY: KINNEY SHOE CORPORATION'S FIRST
CENTURY IN FOOTWEAR 74 (Winthrop Group 1994).
155 Kinney Shoe, 939 F.2d at 210.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 209-10.
158 Id. at 209.
159 Id. at 210.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 212.
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Polan had failed to carry out the corporate formalities aided the court in the con-
clusion that Laya's first two prongs had been met. 62 However, the District
Court, after applying Laya's third "sophisticated commercial entity prong,"
ruled that Kinney Shoe could not pierce the corporate veil because it "'assumed
the risk of Industrial's defaulting' and that 'the application of the doctrine of
"piercing the corporate veil" ought not and does not [apply]."" 163
The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.' 64 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, stating
that the lower court improperly applied Laya's third prong.1 65 The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the district court had correctly found that the first prong of Laya
(the disregard of formalities requirement) had been met because Polan "kept no
minutes, and elected no officers for Industrial."' 166 The court also held that the
district court correctly found that the second prong of Laya (an equitable result,
or fairness requirement) had likewise been met because:
Polan gave no explanation or justification for the existence of
Industrial as the intermediary between Polan Industries, Inc. and
Kinney. Polan was obviously trying to limit his liability and the
liability of Polan Industries, Inc. by setting up a paper curtain
constructed of nothing more than Industrial's certificate of in-
corporation. 167
The court further concluded that the third prong of Laya was permissive
and not mandatory because the use of the third prong in the case would lead to
an inequitable result. 68 According to the Fourth Circuit, "Polan set up Indus-
trial to limit his liability and the liability of Polan Industries, Inc. in their deal-
ings with Kinney... [t]his corporation was no more than a shell - a transparent
shell." 169 The court, again focusing on the defendant's lack of adherence to any
semblance of corporate formalities and his failure to invest any capital into the
"shell company," stated that "this is not a factual situation that calls for the third
prong, if we are to seek an equitable result."
170
The court stated that the normal rule of limiting shareholder liability in
the corporation to the amount invested did not apply in this instance because
"[w]hen nothing is invested in the corporation, the corporation provides no pro-
162 Id.
163 Id. (quoting the district court).
164 Id. at 211.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 212.
167 Id.
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tection to its owner; nothing in, nothing out, no protection. If Polan wishes the
protection of a corporation to limit his liability, he must follow the simple for-
malities of the corporation."' ' 7' The Fourth Circuit then explicitly left the
bounds of Laya's third prong in doubt, stating that "[w]ithout deciding whether
the third prong should be extended beyond the context of the financial institu-
tion lender mentioned in Laya, we hold that, even if it applies to creditors such
as Kinney, it does not prevent Kinney from piercing the corporate veil in this
case."' 172 The Fourth Circuit held Polan personally liable for the debts of Indus-
trial and remanded with instruction to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
1 73
2. Analysis of Kinney Shoe
The Fourth Circuit, in its holding, effectively collapsed Laya's three-
prong test for sophisticated contract creditors into two prongs. The district court
found that the first two prongs of the Laya test had been met because Polan did
not run the business as a separate entity (the disregard of formalities require-
ment) and the corporation had no capital and was set up solely to limit the liabil-
ity of Polan and Polan Industries, Inc. (the fairness or equity requirement). 174
As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly
found that the first two prongs had been satisfied. 175 However, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that since Polan had invested nothing into the corporation and had set
it up solely to be a "paper curtain" in order to limit his personal liability, 176 he
would be offered no limited liability under Laya's third prong because allowing
that would lead to an inequitable result. 177 The court offers the same justifica-
tions for stating that the third prong should not apply as it did in finding that the
first two prongs had been met.178 Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the
third prong, focusing on the fairness of the situation and Polan's failure to ad-
here to the requirements of the corporate form; (such as adequately capitalizing
the corporation), any instance in which the first two prongs will be met would
also exclude the use of the third prong. Under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, it
seems difficult to imagine a situation in which any creditor, even a sophisticated
commercial entity like the commercial lender commented upon in Laya, would
be denied the ability to pierce the corporate veil.
In Laya, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that the
limitation of liability shareholders enjoy is one of the chief facets of the corpo-
171 Id.
172 Id. at 212-13.
173 Id. at 213.




178 Id. at 212-13.
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rate entity, and that "courts have been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, even
when the express purpose of incorporation was to limit the liability of the incor-
porators. Indeed courts of every jurisdiction have recognized the legitimacy of
incorporating to avoid personal liability."'' 79 One of the major facets of the
corporate form is the limitation of liability that it offers its shareholders, and any
time a contract creditor goes unpaid, the result will be inequitable to the credi-
tor. This result is one of the consequences of contracting with a corporation,
which, by definition, limits the liability of its shareholders.
Also, the Fourth Circuit simply stated that because Polan invested noth-
ing into Industrial he would not be able to limit his liability in the case. 80 This
statement leaves many questions unanswered. How much capital would Polan
have needed to invest in the corporation to permit the application of the third
prong? What if Polan had invested one dollar, or one hundred dollars, into the
corporation, would the prong have been applied? The Fourth Circuit offered no
assistance in this area.
Furthermore, the fact that Industrial had "no assets, no income and no
bank account"'181 makes the argument in favor of holding Kinney Shoe to Laya's
third prong in this case even stronger. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[w]ithout
deciding whether the third prong should be extended beyond the context of the
financial institution lender mentioned in Laya, we hold that, even if it applies to
creditors such as Kinney, it does not prevent Kinney from piercing the corporate
veil in this case."' 182 The court made this assertion without offering any justifi-
cation as to why it made the distinction between the corporate lender example in
Laya's third prong and the equally sophisticated corporate plaintiff in the
case.1
83
Here, any type of "investigation of the credit of the corporation prior to
entering into the contract" as stated in Laya's third prong,' 84 would have given
Kinney Shoe notice that the corporation with which it was contracting had no
assets whatsoever. This was not an instance in which Industrial had capital
which ultimately was inadequate to meet its contractual obligations, or a situa-
tion in which Industrial had adequate capital that was later withdrawn by Polan.
Even the most cursory investigation by Kinney Shoe, a corporation that, by all
accounts, was every bit as sophisticated as the corporate lender example in
Laya, would have put Kinney Shoe on notice that Industrial had no assets with
179 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 97 (W. Va. 1986) (emphasis added).
180 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991).
181 Id. at 210.
182 Id. at 212-13.
183 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 2:53 n.28. Kinney Shoe was quite a large business entity. In the
1970s Kinney Shoe became the parent corporation of Foot Locker, Inc. See MCDERMoTrr, supra
note 154, at 74. In 1994, just three years after the Fourth Circuit case, Kinney Shoe contributed,
mainly through its Footlocker shoe stores, $3.5 billion in sales and sixty percent of the profits of
the entire Woolworth organization. See id. at 105.
184 352 S.E.2d at 100.
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which to meet its contractual obligations. In this instance, as stated in Laya,
"such an investigation would [have] disclose[d] that the corporation [was]
grossly undercapitalized, based upon the nature and the magnitude of the corpo-
rate undertaking. 185 Accordingly, under Laya's third prong, the party should
have been deemed to have assumed the risk of the gross undercapitalization and
should not have been permitted to pierce the corporate veil. 1
86
C. Mills v. USA Mobile Communications, Inc.: Comments on the
Tort/Contract Distinction
1. Factual History and the Court's Comments on the Distinction
A few years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals heard
another case involving veil piercing by a contract creditor. 187 In Mills, an indi-
vidual owned a corporation that he later sold to USA Mobile Communications,
Inc.' 88 The plaintiff alleged that shareholders of the purchasing corporation
promised him a long-term employment contract to work for the purchasing cor-
poration after the sale. 189 Relying upon this assertion, he quit his job of seven-
teen years and began working for the corporation.190 Less than one year later,
he was fired and summarily filed suit against the corporation and its individual
shareholders for wrongful termination. 191 The circuit court found only the cor-
poration liable. 192 Fearing that the corporation would not have adequate capital
from which to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff appealed to hold the sharehold-
ers personally liable for the judgment under a piercing theory. 1
93
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, citing various authori-
ties, elaborated on the distinction between piercing in the tort versus the contract
context. The court noted that "[b]ecause a contract with a corporation is a con-
tract with that legal entity and not the individual stockholders, courts are even
more reluctant to disregard the corporate entity when the dispute involves a con-
tract as opposed to a tort."'194 The court also elaborated on instances in which
contract creditors may pierce the corporate veil. Citing the Mississippi Supreme
Court, 195 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that corporate
185 Id.
186 Id.
197 Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc, 438 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1993).
188 Id. at 2.
189 Id. at 3.
190 Id. at 2, 5.
191 ld. at 3.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 3 & n.8 (W. Va. 1993).
194 Id. at 4-5.
195 See Gray v. Edgewater Landing, Inc., 541 So.2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989).
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creditors must demonstrate: "(a) some frustration of contractual expectations
regarding the party to whom he looked for performance; (b) the flagrant disre-
gard of corporate formalities by the defendant corporation and its principals; (c)
a demonstration of fraud or other equivalent misfeasance on the part of the cor-
porate shareholder."'' 96 The Court, however, did not give any indication as to
what type of misfeasance would be equivalent to fraud except to state that the
corporate shareholder's "inflated promises" of long-term employment did not
meet that level. 197 Noting this, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's judgment against only the corporation. 198
2. Analysis of Mills
In this case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals shifted some-
what back to a stricter standard for all contract creditors. This stance moved
West Virginia more in line with various jurisdictions cited by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in Laya that mandate a much higher burden for con-
tract creditors, even individual creditors, seeking to pierce the corporate veil. 99
The court's reasoning, however, was still in line with West Virginia's traditional
two-prong test for contract creditors in Laya. The "frustration of contractual
expectations" prong under Mississippi law, cited by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, is analogous to the second, "fairness prong" in Laya, and the
"disregard of corporate formalities" prong is essentially the same as Laya's first
200
prong.
The Mills case moved West Virginia in line with jurisdictions that make
a strong distinction between veil piercing under tort and contract claims. 20 1 The
court also recognized some instances in which contract creditors would be able
to pierce the corporate veil absent an initial financial investigation.202 The third
prong cited by the court allows contract creditors the ability to pierce if they can
demonstrate "fraud or other equivalent misfeasance on the part of the corporate
shareholder., 20 3 This third "fraud or equivalent misfeasance" prong expressed
by the court is far from a new concept. In fact, many jurisdictions have permit-
ted the piercing of the corporate veil by contract creditors for this reason.204
196 Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5 (citing Gray, 541 So.2d at 1047).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610, 618
(N.D. Me. 1977); Critzer v. Oban, 326 P.2d 53, 57-58 (Wash. 1958).
200 Compare Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5 (citing Gray, 541 So.2d at 1047), with Laya v. Erin Homes,
Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986).
201 See, e.g., Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. 1998).
202 Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5.
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Musselman, 222 F. Supp. 2d 792, 798 (E.D. Va. 2002); Casciola
v. F.S. Air Service, Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1064 (Alaska 2005); Fontana v. TLD Builders, Inc., 840
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The "fraud or equivalent misfeasance" prong of Mills, while hardly a
novel invention, is worth focusing on because it helps to define the limits of the
Laya decision. This prong, while applicable to the contract creditor, would ac-
tually mandate that the contract creditor prove tortious activity, either in the
form of fraud, or some activity on that level on the part of the corporate share-
holders. This prong, in essence, mandates that the contract creditor also be a
tort creditor in order to recover damages from the corporate shareholders.2 °5
Once this happens, the claim moves from contract to tort and out of the realm of
the holdings of Laya and Kinney Shoe, which dealt with purely contractual
claims for piercing.
2°6
This case moved West Virginia law beyond the dicta in Laya concern-
ing sophisticated contract creditors. Mills permits sophisticated contract credi-
tors that would normally be precluded from piercing under Laya the opportunity
to pierce if they can show tortious activity such as fraud or equivalent misfea-
sance by the shareholders. 207 This is because all sophisticated commercial enti-
ties, even the financial lender cited in Laya, must have accurate information
concerning the corporation's finances upon which to base its decision to con-
tract with the defendant corporation. 208
D. The Current State of Piercing Under a Contract Claim in West Virginia
Currently, the corporate veil may be pierced under a purely contractual
claim in West Virginia when there is a unity of interests between the corporation
and the shareholders, an inequitable result would occur if the corporate fiction
was adhered to.2°9 Also, depending upon the circumstances, some sophisticated
commercial entities, such as financial lending institutions that are able to con-
duct a credit check before contracting with the corporation, will be deemed to
have assumed the risk of undercapitalization and will not be permitted to pierce
the corporate veil. 210 However, the courts have left open which entities will be
deemed sophisticated enough to warrant the application of Laya's third prong,
and under what circumstances the sophisticated commercial entity would be
charged with the assumption of the risk of undercapitalization.
N.E.2d 767, 776 (111. App. 2005); Turner v. Turner, 809 A.2d 18, 60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002);
Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 330 (N.C. 1985).
205 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:10.
206 See generally Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991); Laya v. Erin
Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
207 Mills, 438 S.E.2d at 5.
208 See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979, 987 (1971).
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V. THE EXTENSION OF LAYA TO ALL SOPHISTICATED COMMERCIAL ENTITIES
All sophisticated commercial entities, not just commercial lenders, are
able to protect themselves through evaluating and allocating the risk associated
with the corporation's capitalization level during pre-contractual negotiations.
Accordingly, the extension of Laya's third prong to all sophisticated commercial
entities is appropriate. Under West Virginia law, all contract creditors that are
deemed by the court to be "sophisticated commercial entities," should not be
permitted to pierce the corporate veil under a purely contractual claim.2"
A. Foreign Jurisdictions Prohibiting Certain Creditors from Piercing Un-
der a Contract Claim
There are already several jurisdictions that have denied many types of
contract creditors the ability to pierce the corporate veil212 in addition to the so-
phisticated commercial lender cited in Laya.213 In one such case,214 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Maine held that a group of la-
bor unions could not pierce the corporate veil because the unions had the ability
to protect themselves in the bargaining process. 21 5  The court stated that:
"[c]ontracts are private, consensual relationships in which each party has a clear
and equal obligation to weigh the potential benefits and risks of the agree-
ment," 216 and that unless some tortious activity is involved, "there can be little
justification for disregarding corporate entities which the parties obviously ex-
pected to remain intact.,
217
The Supreme Court of Washington denied a contract creditor's attempt
to pierce the corporate veil under similar reasoning.2 8 The contract creditor, an
individual who had sold eggs to the defendant chicken hatchery, filed suit under
a piercing theory against the corporation's shareholders for the debts owed by
the then bankrupt hatchery. 21 9 The court stated that the corporate creditor could
not pierce the veil since the plaintiff "made no attempt whatever to obtain any
211 See supra note 18, defining a "purely contractual claim."
212 See e.g., Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1937); United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Me. 1977); Critzer v. Oban, 326 P.2d 53 (Wash.
1958).
213 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
214 United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 439 F. Supp. 610.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 618.
217 Id.
218 Critzer, 326 P.2d 53.
219 Id. at 54-55.
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information regarding the financial status of the corporation . . . before com-
mencing to sell eggs to it."
220
In another case, Hanson v. Bradley,221 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts denied an individual contract creditor's attempt to pierce the cor-
porate veil because he had adequate knowledge of the corporation's lack of
capital before contracting. 222 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts did not al-
low the veil to be pierced because, according to the Court:
[t]he right and the duty of courts to look beyond the corporate
forms are exercised only for the defeat of fraud or wrong, or the
remedying of injustice. In the present case we have a corpora-
tion formed without substantial capital, relying on borrowing
money to make valuable a hotel that it was buying on credit.
The plaintiff dealt with the corporation. There is nothing to
show that he was deceived. The fair inference is that he knew
the worthlessness of the corporation with which he contracted,
and he knew that his contract was of no value unless the corpo-
ration could borrow money.223
The court did not deem the individual plaintiff to be a "sophisticated" contract
creditor.224 It focused instead on the plaintiff's knowledge or access to pertinent
information, because of his unique position as an employee of the company,
regarding the company's capitalization level.22 While the employee in Hanson
was not a sophisticated commercial entity within the meaning of Laya, he did
possess the main factor that precludes sophisticated commercial entities from
piercing under contract claims in many jurisdictions: access to information con-
cerning the corporation's capitalization level.
These cases, while dealing with piercing attempts by entities and indi-
viduals other than the commercial lender example in Laya, and in many differ-
ent circumstances, all arrive at the same conclusion: the access to information
concerning the defendant corporation's capitalization level should preclude an
entity that contracts with the corporation from later attempting to pierce the veil
because the entity knew, or should have known, that the corporation did not
have adequate capital with which to meet its obligations.226
220 Id. at 57.
221 10 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1937).
222 Id. at 264.
M Id. (emphasis added).
VA See generally Hanson, 10 N.E.2d 259.
M See id. at 264.
226 See id.; Critzer v. Oban, 326 P.2d 53 (Wash. 1958); see also Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352
S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986).
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These jurisdictions all proffer the same policy behind the piercing doc-
trine as West Virginia courts: the remedying of injustice to the contract credi-
227 2tor.   Several of these jurisdictions' "third prongs" have a very wide reach. 2 8
Courts in Massachusetts and Washington have denied individual contract credi-
tors the ability to pierce the corporate veil because these individuals could have
determined the capitalization level of the defendant corporation before contract-
ing. 9 In contrast, West Virginia limits its third prong to "certain types ... of
contract creditors of the corporation.,
230
If certain individual contract creditors can be charged with the knowl-
edge that a pre-contractual capitalization investigation would disclose, certainly
any sophisticated commercial entity with many more resources at its disposal
than an individual, has the ability to conduct a similar investigation. In fact,
these entities have something much more valuable than the mere ability to ac-
cess information. These entities, because of their "sophistication," have the
ability to bargain on this information for more favorable contract terms and al-
locate the risk associated with the corporation's capitalization level accordingly.
Most individual contract creditors, like those whose attempts to pierce were
denied by courts in Massachusetts and Washington, 231 normally do not have the
232ability to bargain with the defendant corporation for better terms. These indi-
viduals usually must either accept the risk of undercapitalization or pass on the
opportunity to contract with the corporation. It makes little sense to allow any
sophisticated commercial entity, which has not only all the tools available to it
to determine the capitalization level of the corporation, but also the bargaining
power to take adequate steps to protect itself, the ability to hold the individual
shareholders liable for the corporate debt if the corporation's capitalization level
is ultimately found to be inadequate.
27 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F.Supp 610, 619 (N.D.
Me. 1977) ("The corporate entity will be disregarded when used to cover fraud or illegality, or to
justify a wrong."); Hanson, 10 N.E.2d at 264 ("The right and the duty of courts to look beyond the
corporate forms are exercised only for the defeat of fraud or wrong, or the remedying of injus-
tice."); Critzer, 326 P.2d 53, 57 (stating that one instance in which the veil will be pierced is when
there is "such a confusion of identities and acts [between the corporation and its shareholders] as
to work a fraud upon third persons).
M See Hanson, 10 N.E.2d 259; Critzer, 326 P.2d 53.
229 Id.
230 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
231 See generally Hanson, 10 N.E.2d 259; Critzer, 326 P.2d 53.
232 This not to say that all individuals would not have the bargaining power to demand contrac-
tual terms consistent with the corporation's capitalization level. Consider an individual such as
Donald Trump. While an individual creditor, Donald Trump would have all of the same protec-
tions available to him as would any sophisticated commercial entity because of his financial re-
sources. However, most individual contract creditors in the consumer context would not have the
financial resources to conduct the appropriate credit check or bargain with the corporation for
better terms prior to contracting. See JAMES B. HERENDEEN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE CORPORATE
ECONOMY 29 (Dunellen Pub. Co. 1975) (stating that most consumers are "price takers" and cannot
bargain for better terms).
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B. Defining "Sophisticated Commercial Entities"
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, unlike other jurisdic-
tions, has limited the application of its third prong to sophisticated commercial
entities.233 However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not de-
fined a "sophisticated commercial entity" in the context of corporate veil pierc-
ing save the example of the corporate lender noted in Laya.234 Because the
piercing doctrine in West Virginia, and in all jurisdictions for that matter, is
fact-intensive, 235 a precise "bright-line" definition of these entities would most
likely be inappropriate.
There are many characteristics that courts in both West Virginia and
foreign jurisdictions have deemed indicative of "sophisticated commercial enti-
ties" outside the piercing doctrine.236 These characteristics would be helpful for
courts in West Virginia to use under the "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach to determine if Laya's third prong should be applied under the circum-
stances.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not definitively set
out what constitutes a "sophisticated commercial entity," but it has made several
comments upon the characteristics of these entities in cases dealing with con-
tract disputes over large-scale construction projects. Some of these characteris-
tics include: competence in bargaining over the terms of the contract; 237 the abil-
ity to be charged with knowledge of the laws in the state in which they are con-
tracting; 238 the ability to carefully, and at arm's length, negotiate the terms of the
agreement; 239 and the opportunity to allocate economic risk through their bar-
gaining power in negotiating the terms of contract .2
Other jurisdictions have elaborated upon similar characteristics when
discussing "sophisticated commercial entities." These characteristics include:
"the knowledge and ability to allocate liability in their [agreements]," 241 bar-
233 Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 100.
234 Id.
235 Id. See also Barber, supra note 5, at 385.
236 See, e.g., Burning Creek Marrowbone Land Co. v. E. Ky. Energy Corp., No. 90-3018 (4th
Cir. Aug. 22, 1990) (applying West Virginia law); MASB-SEG Prop./Cas. Pool, Inc. v. Metalux,
586 N.W.2d 549, 510-11 (Mich. App. 1998); Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft,
Inc. 59 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Mo. 2001); Malan Realty Investors v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo.
1997); Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Sur. Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 686 (W. Va. 2005); E. Steel
Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266, 278 (W. Va. 2001) (Maynard, J., dissenting);
G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 355 S.E.2d 32, 37 (W. Va. 1987).
237 Wellington Power Corp., 614 S.E.2d at 686.
238 G.M. McCrossin, Inc., 355 S.E.2d at 37.
239 Burning Creek Marrowbone Land Co., No. 90-3018 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 1990) (applying
West Virginia law).
240 E. Steel Constructors, Inc., 549 S.E.2d at 278 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
241 MASB-SEG Prop.iCas. Pool, Inc., 586 N.W.2d at 554.
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gaining power on par with the defendant corporation, 242 "experience[] in [the]
type of transaction" at issue,243 and the ability to obtain counsel in the negotia-
tion process. 244
All of these authorities, including West Virginia, paint the same picture
of the "sophisticated commercial entity": an entity that, through access to in-
formation regarding the defendant corporation's capitalization level, has the
ability to competently evaluate the risks associated with contracting with the
corporation and that has the opportunity to actively participate, through counsel,
in the negotiation process and allocate the risks associated with the undertaking
through contract negotiation. Under Laya's third prong, any entity that meets
these criteria should be deemed a "sophisticated commercial entity" and able to
"conduct an investigation of the credit of the corporation prior to entering into
the contract., 245 Accordingly, these entities should not be permitted to pierce
the corporate veil under a purely contractual claim.
C. The Bounds of Laya: Fraud or Equivalent Misfeasance by the Corpo-
rate Shareholders
A contract creditor that is deemed by the court to be "sophisticated"
enough to conduct a credit check before contracting with the defendant corpora-
tion under Laya may still be able to pierce the corporate veil.246 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was correct when it stated that there would be some
instances in which deeming that the sophisticated commercial entity had as-
sumed the risk of the corporation's undercapitalization would lead to an inequi-
table result.247 However, the instances in which the sophisticated contract credi-
tor can pierce the corporate veil should be applied in much narrower circum-
stances than the Fourth Circuit suggested in Kinney Shoe. 248 The creditor should
not be charged with assuming the risk of the corporation's level of capitalization
only if the sophisticated contract creditor can show some sort of tortious activity
by the corporate shareholders on the level of "fraud or other equivalent misfea-
sance" under Mills.249  Before contracting with the corporation, the sophisti-
cated creditor is presumed to know that he is doing business with a corporation
242 Id.
243 Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 510-11 (Mo.
2001).
24 See Malan Realty Investors, Inc. v. Harris, 953 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1997).
245 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986).
246 Id.
247 See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1991).
24 See id.
249 Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1 at 5 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting Gray v.
Edgewater Landing, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989).
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and it will be able to satisfy his claim. 250 Courts often impose this burden "be-
cause limited liability is a permissible," and even encouraged, "object of incor-
poration. '251 However, the "principle of limited liability does not protect the
shareholder ... whose conduct is calculated to defeat the reasonable expecta-
tions of the creditor. ,
252
In order for a sophisticated commercial entity to protect itself in the ne-
gotiation process, it must have accurate information upon which to base its deci-
sions concerning the terms of the contractual agreement.253 Absent a full and
fair disclosure on the part of the shareholders of the corporation concerning its
level of capitalization, there can be no effective assessment and allocation of
risk between the parties. 254 Accordingly, entities that would otherwise be denied
the ability to pierce under Laya should not be precluded from piercing the cor-
porate veil if they can show fraud in the bargaining process or later misfeasance
by the corporate shareholders that significantly affects the corporation's capi-
talization level.255
Once the contract creditor alleges this type of activity by the corporate
shareholders, the claim, in essence, transforms from a contract into a tort theory
of piercing. 256 This is not to say that the contract creditor would be permitted to
pierce by merely alleging any type of tortious activity on the part of the corpo-
rate shareholders. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, through its
language in Mills, recognized that precisely because many contract creditors are
in a position to determine the capitalization level of the corporation, the creditor
must allege actions on the level of fraud in the inducement or later actions that
significantly affect capitalization, 257 which are very different from other later
tortious actions, such as simple negligence.258
Once fraud or equivalent misfeasance is alleged, the focus is then on the
tortious activity of the shareholders, rather than the breach of the contractual
agreement between the parties, that gives rise to the imposition of personal li-
ability on the shareholders. 259 Accordingly, the application of Laya and Kinney
250 See Iron City Sand & Gravel Div. of McDonough County v. West Fork Towing Corp., 298
F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (N.D.W. Va. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 440 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 197 1).
251 Cummins, supra note 6, at 442.
252 Id.
253 See Hamilton, supra note 208, at 987.
254 Id.
255 See Cummins, supra note 6, at 452-55 (discussing various tortious actions by the corporate
shareholders, such as "fraud in the inducement," that have permitted contract creditors to pierce
the corporate veil).
256 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:10.
257 See Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 1993).
258 See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966). In this case, the plaintiff at-
tempted to pierce under a tort theory (negligence) after he was hit by a cab owned by the defen-
dant's corporation. Id.
259 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:10.
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Shoe (which dealt with purely contractual claims) would no longer be appropri-
ate given the implications of the later test in Mills.26° Because such allegations
move the claim into a tort theory of piercing, in light of the relatively narrow
focus of this Note, an in-depth discussion of the various tortious activities on the
part of the corporate shareholders rising to the level of "misfeasance" equivalent
to the tort of fraud on the part of the corporate shareholders under Mills would
be best left to another inquiry.
VI. ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXTENSION OF
LA YA
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in one corporate veil pierc-
ing case that: "when one extends credit or makes any other contractual arrange-
ment with a corporation, it is to be assumed he acquaints himself with the corpo-
ration's capitalization and contracts on such basis[]" 26' One commentator has
stated: "contract creditors can protect themselves by bargaining with the con-
trolling shareholder .... [T]o the extent contract creditors fail to do so, and ac-
cordingly fail to adequately protect their own interests, there seems little reason
for the law to protect them., 262 This is, in essence, one aspect of the reasoning
behind extending the third prong of Laya to all sophisticated commercial enti-
ties.
The third prong expressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Laya should be extended because all sophisticated entities, not just
commercial lenders, have, because of their "sophistication," various means
available to them to protect their interests during the negotiation process.2 63
These include: the ability to check the capitalization level of the corporations
with which they contract, the ability to transfer the risk of the corporation de-
faulting back onto the corporation or its shareholders by their ability to ask for
prepayment from the corporation, the ability to charge a higher price for the risk
associated with the contracting corporation's level of capitalization, and the
ability to obtain personal guarantees from the shareholders of the corporation
with which they contract.
There are also several other economic arguments in favor of extending
Laya, aside from the protections available to sophisticated commercial entities.
The contract creditor is the "least cost avoider" of the contracting parties be-
cause it is in a better position to determine the risks associated with contracting
than the shareholders of even a closely held corporation.26 4 Also, the imposition
260 438 S.E.2d at 1.
261 Dewitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686 at n.13 (4th
Cir. 1976).
262 Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 501.
263 See Vincent M. Roche, "Bashing the Corporate Shield": The Untenable Evisceration of
Freedom of Contract in the Corporate Context, 28 J. CoRP. L. 289, 297-98 (2003).
2M Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 502.
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of personal liability on shareholders of close corporations would force these
individuals to incur great costs incumbent in closely monitoring the activities of
other shareholders of the close corporation. 265 Finally, allowing sophisticated
contract creditors the ability to pierce would also, in essence, be permitting the
creditor to receive a windfall because it could charge the corporation a higher
price associated with the risk of the corporation's capitalization level, yet virtu-
ally eliminate its risk through veil piercing.
There are also two main public policy justifications for extending Laya
to all sophisticated commercial entities. First, allowing sophisticated entities to
pierce the veil of close corporations under a contract claim would directly vio-
late one of the main justifications behind the rise of the limited liability corpora-
tion: permitting the access of investors of more modest means to business mar-
kets.26 Second, West Virginia's recognition of freedom of contract,26 7 and the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' willingness to uphold contracts duly
entered into, especially between sophisticated commercial entities268 that have
the ability to protect their interests, should override any concerns West Virginia
courts may have regarding injustice to sophisticated contract creditors.
A. Economic Justifications for the Extension of Laya
1. The Ability of All Sophisticated Commercial Entities to Con-
duct a Credit Check
Several jurisdictions have charged individual contract creditors with the
knowledge of the corporation's capitalization level, and denied them the ability
to pierce because of that knowledge. 269 If an individual with far fewer resources
than any sophisticated contract creditor can be charged with the knowledge that
a credit check would provide, there is little reason why any sophisticated con-
tract creditor should not be charged with this same knowledge. When most
business creditors contract with corporations, the possibility of insolvency is
understood and treated as just another cost associated with doing business with a
limited liability corporation. 270 This common recognition by corporate creditors
of the possibility of insolvency is why limited liability corporations are required
265 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
Cm. L. REV. 89,95 (1985).
266 PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:7.
267 See Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Hines, 102 S.E. 106, 108 (W. Va. 1920).
268 Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Surety Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 686 (W. Va. 2005).
269 See, e.g., Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1937); Critzer v. Oban, 326 P.2d 53
(Wash. 1958).
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to record information regarding their financial limitations and offer this infor-
mation to the public. 271
The West Virginia Supreme Court has already noted the ability of cor-
porate lenders, such as banks, to conduct a credit check before contracting with
corporations. 272 There is no reason why any other contract creditor that has
been deemed by the court to be a "sophisticated commercial entity" cannot con-
duct a similar credit check of the corporation before contracting. Sophisticated
commercial entities have many resources available to them and it would be
much easier for them to ascertain the corporation's level of capitalization before
contracting than it would be for an individual contract creditor.
2. Protections Available to Sophisticated Commercial Entities Be-
cause of Their Bargaining Power
Certain contract creditors, because of their "sophistication," have the
ability to act on information concerning the corporation's level of capitalization
in the negotiation process. Unlike the individual, who often has no ability to
negotiate with the corporation for more favorable terms, the sophisticated com-
mercial entity, through its access to counsel in the bargaining process and com-
petence in negotiation, has various means available to protect itself in the nego-
tiation process.273 These various protections act, in essence, to transfer the risk
of the limited liability corporation defaulting back onto the corporation or its
shareholders.274
The sophisticated contract creditor may ask for prepayment for services
rendered to the corporation. 275 By demanding payment from the corporation up
front, the contract creditor would all but eliminate the risk of default associated
with contracting with a limited liability corporation. However, some corpora-
tions, particularly those that are closely held, may not be able to pay up front
because of limited capital.
If the contract creditor has conducted a capitalization investigation and
has reservations about the level of capitalization being adequate to meet the
corporation's liabilities, the sophisticated contract creditor has the ability to ask
the corporate shareholders for a personal guarantee. 276 This guarantee would
modify the "default" model of the corporation offering limited liability to the
271 Id.
272 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 100 (W. Va. 1986).
23 See HERENDEEN, supra note 232, at 29 (stating that large corporations are "price makers"
and consumers are "price takers").
r4 See Roche, supra note 263, at 297-98.
25 See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (Utah 1990) ('The fact
that a company is undercapitalized can be overcome in many contractual settings, because the
parties can allocate the risk of financial failure as they see fit.").
276 See J-R Grain Co. v. FAC, Inc., 627 F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1980).
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shareholder 277 and would hold the agreeing director or shareholder (in close
corporations often the same person) personally liable for the corporation's con-
tractual obligation.
The sophisticated contract creditor, because of its relative equality in
bargaining power with the corporation, may also raise its price to reflect the risk
associated with the corporation's level of capitalization.278 One common exam-
ple of this type of "price manipulation" is practiced frequently by corporate
lenders. Banks and other lending institutions routinely raise their interest rate
(which is, in essence, the "price" of borrowing money) according to the risk
inherent in the corporation's capitalization level.279
Sophisticated entities other than the corporate lender example in Laya
280
can similarly manipulate the contractual price to reflect the risk associated with
the corporation's level of capitalization. One example would be the building
owner in Kinney Shoe.28' In this instance, the sophisticated contract creditor
would attempt to externalize the risk of contracting with the limited liability
corporation by renting the building at a higher price than it would an individual
with unlimited liability. 282 By charging a higher rent, the contract creditor
would recoup beforehand some of the possible loss associated with the corpora-
tion's inability to meet the terms of the lease agreement. All sophisticated con-
tract creditors, because of their bargaining power, can similarly raise their re-
spective prices in proportion to the risk inherent in the corporation's level of
capitalization. These are just a few of the protections available to sophisticated
contract creditors. There are many other means that contract creditors could use
to transfer the risk of the corporation defaulting on the corporation or its share-
holders.
3. The "Least Cost Avoider" and Veil Piercing
Another economic rationale for extending Laya to all sophisticated
commercial entities is based upon the idea that the sophisticated contract credi-
tor is the "least cost avoider" of the parties to the contract in terms of the costs
associated with limiting the risk of the creditor going unpaid. In other words,
the contract creditor is the party that could most cheaply take precautions to
avoid the possible loss associated with the corporation defaulting on its contrac-
tual obligations. 28 3 This is because even in close corporations with more than a
277 See W. VA. CODE §31D-6-622(b) (2006) (establishing the "default" model of limited liabil-
ity for corporate shareholders under West Virginia law).
278 See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CI L.
REV. 499, 501 (1976).
279 Id.
280 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
281 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).
282 See Roche, supra note 263.
283 Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 502.
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couple shareholders, the creditor rarely negotiates with all the corporate share-
holders. In close corporations, managers contracting on behalf of the corpora-
tion and majority shareholders are often one and the same. These controlling
shareholders are more likely to attempt to externalize risk onto creditors because
they have much at stake.284 It is more cost-effective for the corporate creditor to
demand protections on the front end than to force the individual minority share-
holders of the close corporation to determine if the corporate creditor needs a
personal guarantee from the contracting shareholder in order to avoid future
personal liability through piercing.285
4. Veil Piercing and the Increased Cost to Monitor Other Share-
holders
Another justification for the extension of Laya is that with a greater
possibility of piercing, shareholders of closely-held corporations would have to
engage in costly monitoring of the activities of other shareholders.286 Under a
system of unlimited liability, the rational shareholder (because he or she would
potentially be liable for the whole of the corporation's contractual obligation)
would have to spend valuable time and resources determining whether other
shareholders of the corporation had adequate personal capital to "bear their
share of any debts the corporation was unable to pay., 287 These individuals
would also have to monitor the sale of the corporation's stock to ensure that
stock sold by other shareholders was being purchased by individuals with ade-
quate personal wealth to cover their respective obligations if the veil was
pierced., 88 The imposition of this activity on shareholders would greatly in-
crease the cost associated with investing in close-corporations and, conse-
quently, negatively impact the level of corporate investment into these entities.
5. Veil Piercing and "Fairness" to the Sophisticated Commercial
Entity
Under Laya, one factor that must be met in order to pierce is that there
must be unfairness to the contract creditor. 289 However, allowing any sophisti-
cated commercial entity to pierce under a contract claim would not be remedy-
ing an inequitable situation, but instead would be creating one. By definition,
the corporate form limits the liability of its shareholders to the amount they have
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 265, at 95.
M PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:7.
288 See id.
289 See Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986).
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invested into the corporation.29  Sophisticated commercial entities such as
commercial lenders have the ability to act on their knowledge of the corpora-
tion's capitalization level. 291 Accordingly, they can raise the interest rate they
charge according to the amount of risk associated with the corporation's capi-
talization level in relation to the amount borrowed.292 The same is true of any
other type of sophisticated commercial entity. While these entities may not be
lending money to the corporation, they would be offering some type of goods or
services. The price involved in these contractual agreements would likewise
reflect the risk inherent in the capitalization level of the corporation. All ra-
tional sophisticated contract creditors would attempt to externalize the risk asso-
ciated with contracting with a corporation by raising their respective prices to
cover the risk inherent in the corporation's level of capitalization.293
Permitting any sophisticated commercial entity to pierce the corporate
veil would not remedy an "inequitable" situation. Instead, it would create a
situation in which the sophisticated contract creditor would actually receive a
windfall. Assuming a sophisticated contract creditor checks the capitalization
level of the corporation, it would raise its price according to the risk inherent in
the corporation's capitalization level.294 Allowing the contract creditor the abil-
ity to minimize its risk to almost nothing through piercing, while still charging a
price in proportion to the risk associated with contracting with the limited liabil-
ity corporation would not be remedying an "inequitable" situation. Instead, this
would be giving the sophisticated contract creditor a windfall.
B. Public Policy Justifications for the Extension of Laya
1. Veil Piercing and the Democratic Justification for the Limited
Liability Corporation
As previously noted, one early justification for the limited liability cor-
poration was that of democracy. 295 Limiting the liability of shareholders allows
people of modest means to invest in numerous risky corporations and affords
them access to opportunities that would otherwise be available only to the
wealthiest of investors. 296 Because corporate veil piercing applies only to small,
closely-held corporations, 297 piercing generally impacts only stockholders of
290 See e.g., W. VA. CODE §31 D-6-622(b) (2006) (stating that the liability of the shareholder is
limited to the amount invested into the corporation).
291 See Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 490.
292 Id.
293 See Roche, supra note 263.
294 Id.
295 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:3.
296 See id.
297 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1055.
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more modest means. 298 Allowing veil piercing (particularly in the contract con-
text where the sophisticated creditor had the opportunity to avoid the need to
pierce by using its bargaining strength to protect itself) would directly violate
one of the early justifications for the limited liability corporation; keeping the
entry into business markets both democratic and competitive. 299
This argument has particular resonance in a state such as West Virginia,
which has both a low level of corporate investment 3°° and a low level of per
capita income. 301 Because of this, companies incorporated in West Virginia are
more likely to be small, closely-held corporations created by individuals with
less personal wealth than corporations created in other states.30 2 The costs asso-
ciated with permitting sophisticated contract creditors to pierce the corporate
veil in West Virginia would fall squarely on the shoulders of these small-scale
investors and entrepreneurs.
2. The Freedom of Contract in West Virginia and Veil Piercing
Under a Purely Contractual Claim
Perhaps the most compelling justification for extending Laya's third
prong to all sophisticated commercial entities is the policy of West Virginia
courts regarding the freedom of contract. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has stated that "[t]he right of private contract is one of the highest im-
portance, for nothing contributes more to the general welfare or to the liberties
of the people than freedom of contract., 30 3 The Court has also stated that "the
right of private contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen. The usual
and most important function of courts of justice is . . . to maintain and enforce
contracts. ' 3°  The policy behind freedom of contract is especially pertinent
298 See 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 6, at 2
(3d ed. 1993). Investors in close corporations are often family members or close acquaintances
that rely upon the corporation for not only investment income, but also employment. Id.
299 See PRESSER, supra note 18, § 1:3.
300 See Debra E. Cohen, West Virginia Corporate Law: Is It "Broke"? 100 W. VA. L. REv. 5,
52 (1997) (stating that "West Virginia is not considered a commercial state").
301 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAu, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005
TABLE 653. The per capita income in West Virginia in 2003, as measured in year 2000 dollars,
was $23,146 per year, ranking West Virginia 48th out of the 50 states. Only Arkansas and Missis-
sippi had lower per capita income levels. Per capita income in West Virginia in 2003 was almost
$7,000 less than the national average of $30,033. Id.
302 See Cohen, supra note 300, at 52 n.237. Most corporations in West Virginia are closely-
held corporations. In fact, there are less than twenty publicly traded companies incorporated in
West Virginia. Id Also, the average West Virginian has less disposable income with which to
invest into corporations than the average American. See supra note 301.
303 Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Hines, 102 S.E. 106, 108 (W. Va. 1920) (quoting Bait. & Ohio Sw.
Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900)).
304 McLaugherty v. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co., 68 S.E. 28, 30 (W. Va. 1910)
(quoting Balt. & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900)).
[Vol. 109
40
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 109, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol109/iss1/9
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
when the contract at issue is between two commercial entities of equal sophisti-
cation. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held on more than
occasion that:
men of full age and competent understanding shall have the ut-
most liberty in contracting, and that their contracts, when en-
tered into freely, shall be enforced by the courts of justice.
Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider, -
that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of con-
tract.305
Under West Virginia law, "a contract with a corporation is a contract
with that legal entity and not the individual shareholders."3°6 All sophisticated
entities have tools available to them to protect themselves in the negotiation
process against the risk of the corporation defaulting: they have the ability to
access the corporation's financial records; they can ask for prepayment for ser-
vices; they can demand that the corporate directors agree to be held personally
liable if the corporation cannot meet its obligations; and they can raise their
prices according to the risk inherent in the corporation's level of capitalization.
These abilities come from the relative equality in bargaining power between the
parties during the negotiation process.
Because of this relative equality in bargaining power, sophisticated
commercial entities can bargain for practically any terms in the agreement that
they deem appropriate. This negotiation process allows commercial entities to
evaluate and allocate risk accordingly in the contract terms. An entity, with the
ability to ask for access to the corporation's financial records, the ability to de-
mand personal liability from corporate directors and so on should not be able to
void an otherwise valid contractual agreement with the corporation simply be-
cause it failed to avail itself of all the means of protection available to it in the
negotiation process. Why should the law protect an entity that had every oppor-
tunity to protect itself in the contractual agreement yet failed to do so?
VII. CONCLUSION
The various jurisdictions have many different tests to determine if the
corporate veil should be pierced in any particular case.30 7 These jurisdictions
305 See e.g., Wellington Power Corp. v. CNA Surety Corp., 614 S.E.2d 680, 685 (W. Va. 2005)
(quoting State v. Mem'l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 S.E.2d 425, 430 (W. Va. 1957)).
306 Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (W. Va. 1993) (emphasis added).
307 See e.g., E. Mkt. St. Square, Inc. v. Tycorp Pizza IV, Inc., 625 S.E.2d 191, 198 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (four-factor test); Riddle v. Simmons, 922 So.2d 1267, 1279 (La. Ct. App. 2006)
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often apply their respective piercing tests in a discretionary manner.3 °8 West
Virginia is no exception. In a relatively short amount of time West Virginia has
moved from a jurisdiction that had a somewhat restrictive approach to veil
piercing under a contract claim, to a more liberal approach, and back again.3 9
Currently, the circumstances under which a contract creditor will be
permitted to pierce the corporate veil in West Virginia are anything but clear.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed an extremely sophisticated con-
tract creditor to pierce the corporate veil,310 yet just two years later, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied an individual contract creditor's
claim to pierce.31' While there is an understandable hesitance to set out "bright-
line" rules under a doctrine that is so fact-intensive, some judicial guideposts
need to be set that corporations, and contract creditors, within the state can fol-
low.
Lately, West Virginia courts have been moving toward a more restric-
tive view of veil piercing.31 2 The extension of Laya to all sophisticated com-
mercial entities would be consistent with this view. Other jurisdictions have
denied individual contract creditors the ability to pierce the corporate veil be-
cause they possessed information concerning the capitalization level of the cor-
poration with which they were contracting.31 3  Sophisticated commercial enti-
ties have the ability to access needed information concerning capitalization far
easier than individual contract creditors. These entities also have something
much more valuable than the mere access to the corporation's financial informa-
tion; they have the bargaining power to negotiate on the basis of this informa-
tion.
The ability of sophisticated contract creditors to protect themselves
through transferring the risk of default back onto the corporation or its share-
holders; their position to best effectively bear the cost of acquiring the needed
contractual protections; and the costly impact that imposing personal liability on
shareholders would have on these individuals are compelling justifications for
the extension of Laya. Furthermore, the fact that imposing unlimited liability on
308 See e.g., Good v. Holstein, 787 A.2d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) ("there appears to be no
... well settled rule in Pennsylvania ... as to exactly when the corporate veil can be pierced and
when it may not be pierced").
309 Compare S. Elec. Supply Co. v. Raleigh County Nat'l Bank, 320 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1984)
(more cautious approach to veil piercing), with Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va.
1986) (more "freewheeling" approach), and Mills v. USA Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 438 S.E.2d 1
(W. Va. 1993) (moving West Virginia back toward a more restrictive approach, at least for con-
tract creditors).
310 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991).
311 Mills, 438 S.E.2d 1.
312 See id.
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shareholders of close corporations is directly at odds with a main justification
behind the creation of the limited liability corporation, along with West Vir-
ginia's policy of upholding contracts, especially between entities of equal so-
phistication, all but compels the extension of Laya to all sophisticated commer-
cial entities. It makes little economic or legal sense for courts in West Virginia
to reward any sophisticated contract creditor that had every opportunity to in-
vestigate the capitalization level of the contracting corporation and the bargain-
ing power to adequately protect itself for its failure to do so.
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